On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On continuous reaction function equilibria in duopoly supergames with mean payoffs
zbMATH Open document ID: 0598.90102
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90027-X
author: William G. Stanford
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Continuous reaction function equilibria are studied in supergames in which the stage game resembles a standard duopoly game and the evaluation relations are according to the limit of the means. It is proven that ''collusive'', i.e., single-period game non-Nash equilibrium, stationary outcomes are supported in subgame perfect equilibrium by linear reaction function pairs. Conversely, it is shown that linear reaction equilibria are, in essence, typical in the class of subgame perfect continuous reaction equilibria. Further, the multiple equilibrium problem of the Folk theorem is shown to be significantly diminished in restricting attention to subgame perfect linear reaction equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 3965855
zbMATH Keywords: Continuous reaction function equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: supergames
zbMATH Keywords: stationary outcomes
zbMATH Keywords: perfect equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3956774
cites work: On the abundance of aperiodic behaviour for maps on the interval
cites work: Reaction Functions and the Theory of Duopoly
cites work: Simple mathematical models with very complicated dynamics
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Subgame perfect reaction function equilibria in discounted duopoly supergames are trivial
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(86)90027-x
OpenAlex ID: W2034189591
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3965855