A further note on the stable matching problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A further note on the stable matching problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0603.05033
DOI: 10.1016/0166-218X(87)90059-X
author: Gabrielle Demange
author: David Gale
author: Marilda Sotomayor
published in: Discrete Applied Mathematics
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Using a lemma of J. S. Hwang we obtain a generalization of a theorem of \textit{L. E. Dubins} and \textit{D. A. Freedman} [Am. Math. Mon. 88, 485-494 (1981; Zbl 0449.92024)]. It is shown that the core of the matching game is non-manipulable in a suitable sense by coalitions consisting of both men and women. A further strong stability property of the core is derived.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 05C70
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
zbMATH DE Number: 3972897
zbMATH Keywords: core
zbMATH Keywords: matching game
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: strong stability property
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem
cites work: Some remarks on the stable matching problem
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
full work available at URL: 0166-218x(87)90059-x
OpenAlex ID: W1992705916
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3972897