Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
zbMATH Open document ID: 0603.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90079-1
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81973/
review text: A one-dimensional model of two candidate elections under asymmetric information is theoretically developed and experimentally tested. Candidates do not know voter utility functions, and most voters are uninformed about candidate policy positions. A fulfilled expectations equilibrium is defined, using poll and endorsement data as information sources. It is proved that with any positive fraction of informed voters, any equilibrium extracts all available information: all participants - voters and candidates alike - act as if they were fully informed. For fixed candidate strategies, a dynamic is given for convergence to voter equilibrium, and this process is shown to imply a ''bandwagon effect''.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D99
zbMATH DE Number: 3974643
zbMATH Keywords: one-dimensional model
zbMATH Keywords: candidate elections
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: voter utility functions
zbMATH Keywords: expectations equilibrium
author: Richard D. McKelvey
author: Peter C. Ordeshook
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2033206242
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3974643