Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Foundations of dynamic monopoly and the Coase conjecture
zbMATH Open document ID: 0605.90037
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4
author: Faruk Gul
author: Robert Wilson
author: Hugo F. Sonnenschein
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: refs4232.pdf
review text: Subgame-perfect equilibria are characterized for a market in which the seller quotes a price each period. Assume zero costs, positive interest rate, continuum of buyers, and some technical conditions. If buyers' valuations are positive then equilibrium is unique, buyers' strategies are stationary, and the price sequence is determinant along the equilibrium path but possibly randomized elsewhere. Otherwise a continuum of stationary equilibria can exist, but at most one with analytic strategies. Coase's conjecture is verified for stationary strategies: reducing the period length drives all prices to zero or the least valuation. Connections to bargaining models are described.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 3978770
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic monopoly
zbMATH Keywords: Subgame-perfect equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium path
zbMATH Keywords: continuum of stationary equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining
Wikidata QID: Q122861331
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2141481859
cites work: The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs
cites work: Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
cites work: A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information About Time Preferences
cites work: A Multistage Model of Bargaining
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3978770