On strong representations of games by social choice functions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On strong representations of games by social choice functions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0604.90141
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(86)90022-4
author: Ron Holzman
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Games in characteristic function form are used to model an allocation of decision power among individuals involved in a voting situation. The problem of strong representation is to find a strategically acceptable social choice function that entails the allocation of power prescribed by a given game. Within the class of non-weak characteristic function games, we fully characterize the games that admit a strong representation. We apply this result to Peleg's problem of strong representation of simple games. Our results indicate that a strong representation requires significantly more than has been recognized in the literature.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3976821
zbMATH Keywords: Games in characteristic function
zbMATH Keywords: allocation of decision power
zbMATH Keywords: strong representation of simple games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(86)90022-4
OpenAlex ID: W2025496675
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3976821