Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Finite automata play the repeated prisoner's dilemma
zbMATH Open document ID: 0606.68050
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90021-9
author: Ariel Rubinstein
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper studies two-person supergames. Each player is restricted to carry out his strategies by finite automata. A player's aim is to maximize his average payoff and subject to that, to minimize the number of states of his machine. A solution is defined as a pair of machines in which the choice of machine is optimal for each player at every stage of the game. Several properties of the solution are studied and are applied to the repeated prisoner's dilemma. In particular it is shown that cooperation cannot be the outcome of a solution of the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 3980495
zbMATH Keywords: bounded rationality
zbMATH Keywords: two-person supergames
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
zbMATH Keywords: infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(86)90021-9
OpenAlex ID: W2131724520
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980495