One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: One person/one vote is not efficient given information on factions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0606.90007
DOI: 10.1007/BF00134096
author: Robert F. Bordley
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper argues that if we have any information about special interest groups in a society, then one person/one vote is not the most efficient voting system. Instead weighted voting is appropriate where the weights assigned to the various individuals depend on the correlation between different individual utilities. The reason why one person/one vote is inefficient is that the correlation between individual utilities allows us to get some estimates of preference intensities from the individual votes. After proving this thesis in general, we illustrate it with a three person example. In the example, we find that moderately correlated individuals get the greatest weight.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91E99
zbMATH DE Number: 3980836
zbMATH Keywords: one person/one vote
zbMATH Keywords: efficient voting system
zbMATH Keywords: weighted voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00134096
OpenAlex ID: W1983834610
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980836