Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
zbMATH Open document ID: 0606.90019
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90028-1
author: Dilip Abreu
author: Ennio Stacchetti
author: David G. Pearce
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: refs4632.pdf
review text: There exist optimal symmetric equilibria in the Green-Porter model [see \textit{E. J. Green} and \textit{R. H. Porter}, Econometrica 52, 87-100 (1984; Zbl 0526.90013) and \textit{R. H. Porter}, J. Econ. Theory 29, 313-338 (1983; Zbl 0511.90020)] having an elementary intertemporal structure. Such an equilibrium is described entirely by two subsets of price space and two quantities, the only production levels used by firms in any contingency. The central technique employed in the analysis is the reduction of the repeated game to a family of static games.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 3980848
zbMATH Keywords: optimal symmetric equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: reduction of the repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: family of static games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2162070285
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980848