The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium
zbMATH Open document ID: 0606.90149
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(86)90020-7
author: John O. Ledyard
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/81585/
review text: The author raises the question of: What behavior, if any, can be explained as the Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of some game? The answer provided by the author is that almost any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. He shows, in particular, that given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies, there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Nash equilibrium of the transformed game. One of the conclusions he arrives at as a result of his analyses is that only if one places some (severe) a priori restrictions on the functional forms of utilities and priors, that one gets meaningful restrictions on behavior. The author also comments that his ''conclusions are similar to those, from Walrasian general equilibrium theory, which apply to aggregate excess demand functions. They do not, however, imply that the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium has no content; rather that it is only the combination of assumptions on utilities, priors, and equilibrium which jointly provide meaningful implication''.
reviewed by: Tamer Başar
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62C10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 3980978
zbMATH Keywords: Bayes equilibrium behavior
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: transformed game
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2045528147
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3980978