Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Disadvantageous syndicates and stable cartels: The case of the nucleolus
zbMATH Open document ID: 0609.90013
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90101-3
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers a bilateral market with two complementary commodities and gives a rationale for Aumann's paradox. The relationship between the notion of strong stability of a syndicate, i.e., the property that no group of players wants to exit or to enter the syndicate, and the notion of disadvantageous syndicates is summarized in two results. If the two sides of the market are balanced in terms of endowments, every syndicate is strongly stable. If the two sides of the market are not balanced in terms of endowments, then being advantageous, in Aumann's definition, is necessary and sufficient for a syndicate to be strongly stable.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 3986981
zbMATH Keywords: bilateral market
zbMATH Keywords: two complementary commodities
zbMATH Keywords: Aumann's paradox
zbMATH Keywords: strong stability of a syndicate
author: Patrick Legros
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90101-3
OpenAlex ID: W2055426656
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3986981