Robust trading mechanisms
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Robust trading mechanisms
zbMATH Open document ID: 0609.90015
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90104-9
author: Kathleen M. Hagerty
author: William P. Rogerson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We consider the problem of designing a trading institution for a single buyer and seller when their valuation of the good is private information. It is shown that posted-price mechanisms are essentially the only mechanisms such that each trader has a dominant strategy. A posted-price mechanism is one where a price is posted in advance and trade occurs if and only if all traders agree to trade.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
zbMATH DE Number: 3986983
zbMATH Keywords: trading institution
zbMATH Keywords: single buyer and seller
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: posted-price mechanisms
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90104-9
OpenAlex ID: W2067800745
cites work: Bargaining under Incomplete Information
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3986983