Power and public goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Power and public goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90105-0
author: Abraham Neyman
author: Robert J. Aumann
author: Mordecai Kurz
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: A game-theoretic analysis using the Harsanyi-Shapley nontransferable utility value indicates that the choice of public goods in a democracy is not affected by who has voting rights. This is corroborated by an independent economic argument based on the implicit price of a vote.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4001810
zbMATH Keywords: Harsanyi-Shapley nontransferable utility value
zbMATH Keywords: public goods
zbMATH Keywords: democracy
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90105-0
OpenAlex ID: W2106326335
cites work: Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
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cites work: Voting for Public Goods
cites work: Values of Non-Atomic Games
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cites work: Q3252999
cites work: Measure-Based Values of Market Games
cites work: Values of games with a continuum of prayers
cites work: Values and Derivatives
cites work: The Shapley value in the non differentiable case
cites work: The Partition Value
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cites work: Q5817870
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001810