Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Complete inflation and perfect recall in extensive games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90090
DOI: 10.1007/BF01780634
author: B. George
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper considers the relation between complete inflation and perfect recall of information partitions in extensive games. It is proved that an information partition with perfect recall is completely inflated. This result, combined with Dalkey's theorem, shows that in the class of games (without chance moves) with perfect recall, a game is determinate if and only if every player has perfect information. A necessary and sufficient condition is provided for information partitions whose complete inflations have perfect recall.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 4001897
zbMATH Keywords: complete inflation
zbMATH Keywords: perfect recall of information partitions
zbMATH Keywords: extensive games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5817865
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001897