An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An axiomatization of the \(\tau\)-value
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90095
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(87)90054-0
author: Stef Tijs
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The \(\tau\)-value is characterized by three axioms. It is shown that the \(\tau\)-value is the unique solution concept which is efficient and has the minimal right property and the restricted proportionality property. The minimal right property is weaker than the additivity property, which plays a role in the axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value: together with individual rationality and efficiency additivity implies the minimal right property. The restricted proportionality property says that for games with minimal right vector zero, the dividend given to the players is proportional to the marginal contribution of the players to the grand coalition.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4001902
zbMATH Keywords: \(\tau \)-value
zbMATH Keywords: minimal right property
zbMATH Keywords: restricted proportionality property
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic characterization
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(87)90054-0
OpenAlex ID: W2029429750
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001902