Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Monotonicity of bargaining solutions with respect to the disagreement point
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90097
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90102-5
author: William Thomson
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We investigate whether the best known solutions to the bargaining problem respond appropriately to certain changes in the disagreement point d, for a fixed feasible set. If \(d_ i\) increases, while for each \(j\neq i\), \(d_ j\) remains constant, then these solutions recommend an increase in agent i's payoff, in agreement with intuition. However, the stronger requirement that agent i be the only one to gain is not generally met.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4001904
zbMATH Keywords: bargaining problem
zbMATH Keywords: disagreement point
Wikidata QID: Q59973058
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90102-5
OpenAlex ID: W2082987645
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001904