A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90098
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(87)90051-5
author: Imma J. Curiel
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Weights are attached to the coalitions of a finite set of players in order to reflect the fact that some coalitions are more likely to be formed than others. A new power index for simple games which depends only on these weights and the minimal winning coalitions of a game is introduced. Two axiomatic characterizations of this index are given. Symmetry, dummy player and quarrel properties of the index are treated. Two special forms of the index arising from certain assumptions about the weights are described.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4001905
zbMATH Keywords: new power index
zbMATH Keywords: simple games
zbMATH Keywords: weights
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic characterizations
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(87)90051-5
OpenAlex ID: W1988272468
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001905