Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Large games: Fair and stable outcomes
zbMATH Open document ID: 0617.90100
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90103-7
author: Myrna Wooders
author: William R. Zame
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://purl.umn.edu/1811
review text: We establish that for a broad class of large games with sidepayments, fair outcomes are nearly stable. More precisely, the Shapley value of a large game is in the \(\epsilon\)-core and \(\epsilon\) is very small if the game is very large. The proof uses two other results of independent interest: for large games the power of improvement is concentrated in small coalitions, and the Shapley value of a small syndicate acting together is nearly the sum of the Shapley values which accrue to the members acting alone.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4001907
zbMATH Keywords: large games with sidepayments
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: \(\epsilon \)-core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2025366993
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4001907