Choosing from a tournament
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Choosing from a tournament
zbMATH Open document ID: 0618.90004
DOI: 10.1007/BF00292732
author: H. Moulin
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Given a finite set A of outcomes and a tournament T over A (a complete and asymmetric binary relation), a choice correspondence assigns a subset of A to T called the winners. (We can read aTb as a beats b.) The author gives an axiomatic characterization of Miller's uncovered set in which the winners are the outcomes that beat every other outcomes in at most two steps (a is a in this set if, for any b, either a beats b or beats some c which beats b). The Copeland set is made of outcomes that beat the greatest number of opponents. It is contained in the uncovered set but the author shows that it might be a dominated subset of the uncovered set. Finally, a third correspondence derived from the sophisticated algorithm [see \textit{J. S. Banks}, ibid. 1, 295-306 (1985; Zbl 0597.90011)] is studied. The author shows that it is a better correspondence than the Copeland set from the domination point of view.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4003849
zbMATH Keywords: tournament
zbMATH Keywords: choice correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic characterization
zbMATH Keywords: uncovered set
zbMATH Keywords: Copeland set
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003849