The solidarity axiom for quasilinear social choice problems
This work continues the analysis of the problem initiated by \textit{H. Moulin} [Econometrica 53, 49-67 (1985; Zbl 0602.90009); J. Econ. Theory 36, 120-148 (1985; Zbl 0603.90013)]. The collective choice of alternatives is studied under the assumption of quasilinear preferences of individual agents and permission of side payments. In place of consistency axioms to which the choice must satisfy the author introduces a ''solidarity axiom''. This axiom requires that when new additional agents are included, the original agents be affected in the same direction. The author gives a complete characterization of solutions satisfying the solidarity axiom, in addition to the four basic axioms of Moulin.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4003850