Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. II: Applications
zbMATH Open document ID: 0619.90091
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90100-1
author: B. Douglas Bernheim
author: Michael D. Whinston
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: In the first part of this paper [see the preceding review], we proposed the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium and perfectly coalition- proof Nash equilibrium as solution concepts for strategic environments in which players can freely discuss their strategies, but cannot make binding commitments. This paper undertakes applications to several economic problems, including the behavior of Cournot oligopolists, oligopolistic entry deterrence, cooperation in finite horizon games, and social choice rule implementation.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 4006019
zbMATH Keywords: coalition-proof Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: Cournot oligopolists
zbMATH Keywords: oligopolistic entry deterrence
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation in finite horizon games
zbMATH Keywords: social choice rule implementation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90100-1
OpenAlex ID: W2032487681
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4006019