A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A necessary and sufficient condition for rationalizability in a quasilinear context
zbMATH Open document ID: 0628.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(87)90007-3
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The aim of this note is to give a simple characterization of the rationalizability of decision rules (or action profiles). The necessary and sufficient condition we obtain suggests interesting analogies between the Implementation Problem and Revealed Preference Theory. Two particular cases are examined: (a) The one-dimensional context, which shows that our condition is a generalization of the monotonicity condition of Spence- Mirrlees. (b) The linear step-up, which shows that rationalizability in multiple dimension requires more than monotonicity: it implies also symmetry conditions which are translated by partial differential equations (analogue in this context of Slutsky equations for revealed preference theory).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4022969
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizability of decision rules
zbMATH Keywords: Implementation Problem
zbMATH Keywords: Revealed Preference Theory
author: Jean-Charles Rochet
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(87)90007-3
OpenAlex ID: W1989792334
cites work: THE EQUIVALENCE IN TWO DIMENSIONS OF THE STRONG AND WEAK AXIOMS OF REVEADED PREFERENCE
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4022969