A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0628.90102
DOI: 10.1007/BF00126304
author: H. Andrew Michener
author: David C. Dettman
author: Greg D. Richardson
author: David C. Julseth
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper reports the results of a laboratory experiment investigating sidepayment games represented in normal form. Attempts to predict payoff allocation via the application of solution concepts (such as the Shapley value or the nucleolus) encounter a problem in games of this form, because the game must first be transformed into some other form. Commonly, this other form is a set function defined over coalitions, such as the von Neumann-Morgenstern characteristic function. Because there are enumerous possible transformations, the question arises as to which one provides the most accurate basis for prediction of payoffs. The laboratory experiment tested three such transformations - the mixed strategy characteristic function, the pure strategy characteristic function, and the Harsanyi threat function. Payoff predictions from two solution concepts (Shapley value, nucleolus) were computed on the basis of each of these transformations, making a total of six theories under test. Results of the study show, in general, that payoff predictions based on the Harsanyi threat function and on the mixed strategy characteristic function were more accurate than those based on the pure strategy characteristic function. The most accurate theories were the Shapley value computed from the Harsanyi function, the nucleolus computed from the Harsanyi function, and the Shapley value computed from the mixed strategy characteristic function. Less accurate were the nucleolus computed from the mixed strategy characteristic function and both the nucleolus and the Shapley value computed from the pure strategy characteristic function.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4023068
zbMATH Keywords: laboratory experiment
zbMATH Keywords: sidepayment games
zbMATH Keywords: prediction of payoffs
zbMATH Keywords: mixed strategy characteristic function
zbMATH Keywords: pure strategy characteristic function
zbMATH Keywords: Harsanyi threat function
zbMATH Keywords: Shapley value
zbMATH Keywords: nucleolus
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Mollifiers for games in normal form and the Harsanyi-Selten valuation function
cites work: Constrained \(n\)-person games
cites work: Q3252999
cites work: A Simplified Bargaining Model for the n-Person Cooperative Game
cites work: Q3853466
cites work: Q3049699
cites work: On the Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: Q3252269
cites work: Geometric Properties of the Kernel, Nucleolus, and Related Solution Concepts
cites work: Q3690618
cites work: On the comparative accuracy of lexicographical solutions in cooperative games
cites work: The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
cites work: Q5331038
cites work: Q5817870
cites work: Q3843226
cites work: Q5844986
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4023068