Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The Arrowian case
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Measures of inequality as an aggregation of individual preferences about income distribution: The Arrowian case
zbMATH Open document ID: 0629.90004
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90019-6
author: Alain Trannoy
author: Michel Le Breton
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: An inequality preorder is a preorder on a simplex which satisfies symmetry and strict Schur-convexity (the mathematical equivalent of the principle of transfers of Pigou and Dalton). It is shown that we cannot aggregate individual inequality preorders to a collective one if we are interested in Arrow's aggregation rules. The proof uses an interesting result of \textit{E. Kalai, E. Muller} and \textit{M. Satterthwaite} [Public Choice 34, 87-97 (1979)]. Moreover, we prove further results for the aggregation of individual inequality indices when we allow cardinality and interpersonal comparibility of utility.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 4025103
zbMATH Keywords: inequality preorder
zbMATH Keywords: symmetry
zbMATH Keywords: strict Schur-convexity
zbMATH Keywords: aggregation of individual inequality indices
zbMATH Keywords: interpersonal comparibility of utility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90019-6
OpenAlex ID: W2005990065
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4025103