Sequential Stackelberg equilibria in two-person games
The concept of sequential Stackelberg equilibrium is introduced in the general framework of dynamic, two-person games defined in the Denardo contracting operator formalism. A relationship between this solution concept and the sequential Nash equilibrium for an associated extended game is established. This correspondence result, which can be related to previous results obtained by \textit{T. Başar} and \textit{A. Haurie} [``Feedback equilibria in differential games with structural and modal uncertainties'', JAI Press, Greenwich, Connecticut (1984)], is then used for studying the existence of such solutions in a class of sequential games. For the zero-sum case, the sequential Stackelberg equilibrium corresponds to a sequential maxmin equilibrium. An algorithm is proposed for the computation of this particular case of equilibrium.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4027225