On weighted Shapley values
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On weighted Shapley values
zbMATH Open document ID: 0633.90100
DOI: 10.1007/BF01756292
author: Dov Samet
author: Ehud Kalai
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Nonsymmetric Shapley values for coalitional form games with transferable utility are studied. The nonsymmetries are modeled through nonsymmetric weight systems defined on the players of the games. It is shown axiomatically that two families of solutions of this type are possible. These families are strongly related to each other through the duality relationship on games. While the first family lends itself to applications of nonsymmetric revenue sharing problems the second family is suitable for applications of cost allocation problems. The intersection of these two families consists essentially of the symmetric Shapley value. These families are also characterized by a probabilistic arrival time to the game approach. It is also demonstrated that lack of symmetries may arise naturally when players in a game represent nonequal size constituencies.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4031447
zbMATH Keywords: Nonsymmetric Shapley values
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional form games
zbMATH Keywords: transferable utility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3252999
cites work: Monotonic Solutions to General Cooperative Games
cites work: Q3958302
cites work: Multilinear Extensions of Games
cites work: Q3335556
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4031447