The rationalist conception of logic
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The rationalist conception of logic
zbMATH Open document ID: 0635.03002
author: Steven J. Wagner
published in: Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper argues that first order logic can justly be called logic, whilst second order and similar logics cannot. The argument turns crucially on the recursive enumerability of first order logic, and the significance of this for the epistemological role of logic. Frege's notion of this epistemological role is endorsed; but the notion of knowledge advocated is a sociological one, and thus quite unFregean.
reviewed by: Graham Priest
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03A05
zbMATH DE Number: 4033688
zbMATH Keywords: second order logic
zbMATH Keywords: Frege
zbMATH Keywords: naturalistic epistemology
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1305/ndjfl/1093636843
OpenAlex ID: W2059876818
DOI: 10.1305/NDJFL/1093636843
Recommended article: The Logic in Logicism
Recommended article: The philosophy of logic
Recommended article: Logicism and Logical Consequence
Recommended article: The intuitionistic conceptions of logic
Recommended article: Q5343306
Recommended article: Rationalizability and logical inference
Recommended article: Philosophy of logic
Recommended article: Q4434210
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4033688