On the core of voting games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the core of voting games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0636.90099
DOI: 10.1007/BF00286870
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4037641
zbMATH Keywords: voting games
zbMATH Keywords: non-emptiness of the core
author: Michel Le Breton
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00286870
OpenAlex ID: W2097020790
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4037641