Local perfection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Local perfection
zbMATH Open document ID: 0636.90101
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(87)90118-9
author: Leo K. Simon
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We investigate solution concepts for normal-form games with large strategy spaces. ``Trembling hand'' perfection (THP) is extended to games with compact metric strategy sets. A Nash equilibrium is THP if it is the limit of equilibria in which agents face vanishingly small uncertainty. We refine THP by imposing some structure on the kind of uncertainty that agents face: a THP equilibrium is locally perfect if the uncertainty is ``predominantly local'' in nature, i.e., if agents' probability assessments assign, in the limit, an overwhelmingly large proportion of the total probability mass to events ``in the vicinity of the truth.''.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 4037643
zbMATH Keywords: solution concepts
zbMATH Keywords: normal-form games
zbMATH Keywords: large strategy spaces
zbMATH Keywords: ``Trembling hand'' perfection
zbMATH Keywords: compact metric strategy sets
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: limit of equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(87)90118-9
OpenAlex ID: W4236120697
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4037643