Government-private sector relations as a Stackelberg game. A degenerate case
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Government-private sector relations as a Stackelberg game. A degenerate case
zbMATH Open document ID: 0638.90021
DOI: 10.1016/S0165-1889(87)80004-0
author: P. Bertrand
author: Hisham Abou-Kandil
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: When modelling government-private sector relations in economics as a Stackelberg game, the optimization problems of both players are strongly coupled. If the government and the private sector have similar or contradictory points of view on some issues, this will lead to a proportionality relation between some of the weighting matrices in the players' cost functions. In this case an appropriate change of variables leads to a new Stackelberg game where coupling appears only in terminal conditions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 93A13
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 4041578
zbMATH Keywords: leader-follower
zbMATH Keywords: government-private sector relations
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg game
zbMATH Keywords: coupling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: s0165-1889(87)80004-0
OpenAlex ID: W1483164432
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4041578