Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Stability of jurisdiction structures in economies with local public goods
zbMATH Open document ID: 0647.90013
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90027-3
author: Myrna Wooders
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Individuals of different types can form groups, i.e. jurisdictions, for the purposes of collective consumption and production of local public goods by the members of the jurisdictions. Also, the utility of an individual may be affected by the composition and size of the jurisdiction of which he is a member. Jurisdiction formation is endogenous. Trade of private goods can occur within jurisdictions and within collections of jurisdictions. A stable partition of individuals is shown to exist for all sufficiently large economies. This stability depends, partially, upon the extent of `satisficing' behavior or alternatively, jurisdiction formation costs, both of which can be made arbitrarily small. The major noteworthy assumption is that positive outputs cannot become virtually free in per-capita terms as the economy is replicated; this ensures that the public goods are `local' rather than `pure'; otherwise assumptions on production sets are minimal and, in particular, convexity is not required. To obtain stability with coalition formation costs, additional assumptions are made ensuring that there is a `minimum efficient scale' for coalitions.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
zbMATH DE Number: 4057237
zbMATH Keywords: group formation
zbMATH Keywords: jurisdictions
zbMATH Keywords: collective consumption
zbMATH Keywords: local public goods
zbMATH Keywords: stable partition of individuals
zbMATH Keywords: large economies
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(88)90027-3
OpenAlex ID: W2135106589
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4057237