Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reputation in repeated second-price auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0649.90027
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90151-2
author: Sushil Bikhchandani
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: A model in which two bidders take part in a series of second-price, common-value auctions is examined. The question of an optimal auction from an auctioneer's standpoint, in a repeated auction setting, is partially addressed. It is shown that the results from single auction models do not carry over to repeated auctions, when one of the bidders is endowed with a reputation for bidding aggressively. Second-price auctions with two bidders are highly susceptible to manipulative behaviour by an aggressive bidder, and yield much lower revenues to the auctioneer.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 4060950
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game of incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: symmetric stage game
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetric stage game
zbMATH Keywords: two bidders
zbMATH Keywords: second-price, common-value auctions
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auction
zbMATH Keywords: repeated auction setting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(88)90151-2
OpenAlex ID: W2060126481
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4060950