Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
zbMATH Open document ID: 0652.90013
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90096-8
author: Bhaskar Dutta
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Given a tournament, a new solution concept called the covering set is proposed. The covering relation and the uncovered set due to Fishburn and Miller are now well-know. The covering set is defined from the uncovered set. It requires that all its elements be uncovered within itself and that every element outside it be covered by an element in the union of the covering set and the outside element. This concept gives rise to a new Condorcet choice correspondence which is axiomatically characterized and compared with the Kemeny correspondence and the correspondence based upon the uncovered set. This is an important paper and we can expect that it will be the starting point of new developments in social choice theory.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4064707
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatic characterization
zbMATH Keywords: tournament
zbMATH Keywords: new solution concept
zbMATH Keywords: covering set
zbMATH Keywords: uncovered set
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet choice correspondence
reviewed by: Maurice Salles
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(88)90096-8
OpenAlex ID: W1983254396
cites work: Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
cites work: Q3048536
cites work: Condorcet Social Choice Functions
cites work: Choosing from a tournament
cites work: Choice Functions and Revealed Preference
cites work: Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4064707