The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0653.90098
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90276-1
author: Tommy Chin-Chiu Tan
author: Sérgio Ribeiro da Costa Werlang
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10438/866
review text: We transform a noncooperative game into a Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the priors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors, and so on. We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successively eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively undominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior [see \textit{B. D. Bernheim}, Econometrica 52, 1007-1028 (1984; Zbl 0552.90098); \textit{D. G. Pearce}, Econometrica 52, 1029-1050 (1984; Zbl 0552.90097)]. Sufficient conditions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior and a result akin to \textit{R. J. Aumann} [Econometrica 55, 1-18 (1987; Zbl 0633.90094)], on correlated equilibria, is derived with different hypotheses.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 62C10
zbMATH DE Number: 4066668
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian decision problem
zbMATH Keywords: rationality of players
zbMATH Keywords: iteratively undominated strategies
zbMATH Keywords: rationalizable strategic behavior
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium behavior
zbMATH Keywords: correlated equilibria
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2070645636
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4066668