Symmetry, voting, and social choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Symmetry, voting, and social choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0656.90002
DOI: 10.1007/BF03026639
author: Donald G. Saari
published in: The Mathematical Intelligencer
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This is a delightful introduction to social choice theory from an algebraic point of view. Among the principal results are a new proof of Arrow's theorem using the wreath product of groups, and a proof that Borda's rule is the least manipulable social choice function under symmetry conditions. Indeed, the paper makes a strong case for the claim that Borda's rule is algebraically best, in that it gives rise to a minimal number of voting paradoxes. Examples of highly paradoxical methods, including some used by the American Mathematical Society, are also included.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 20B30
zbMATH DE Number: 4072647
zbMATH Keywords: manipulability
zbMATH Keywords: algebraic point of view
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's theorem
zbMATH Keywords: wreath product of groups
zbMATH Keywords: Borda's rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Social choice and individual values
cites work: Q3741337
cites work: Paradoxes of Preferential Voting
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4072647