Games with informants. An information-theoretical approach towards a game-theoretical problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games with informants. An information-theoretical approach towards a game-theoretical problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0657.90103
DOI: 10.1007/BF01254536
author: H. M. Wallmeier
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of information in non-cooperative games. We shall use methods being provided by information theory. The asymptotic value of a class of two-person zero-sum games is investigated in which one of the players is supplied with some knowledge of the controls chosen by the other. According to this information he then chooses his own controls. Due to this asymmetry a higher payoff arises compared to the outcome of games being played under the usual assumptions. The main result of this chapter is a computable formula for the value of these games.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 94A15
zbMATH DE Number: 4074847
zbMATH Keywords: influence of information
zbMATH Keywords: non-cooperative games
zbMATH Keywords: information theory
zbMATH Keywords: asymptotic value
zbMATH Keywords: two-person zero-sum games
zbMATH Keywords: asymmetry
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q5598243
cites work: Q5595624
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
cites work: Equilibrium points in n -person games
cites work: Q3916401
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01254536
OpenAlex ID: W1985649245
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4074847