Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Consistent voting rules for competitive local public goods economies
zbMATH Open document ID: 0658.90019
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90129-9
author: Joseph Greenberg
author: Benyamin Shitovitz
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We establish the existence of a ``voting-market equilibrium'' for a large class of local public goods economies where, faced with prices of the private goods and with the public goods produced by the local governments, each firm maximizes its profits and each individual maximizes his utility subject to his budget constraint. In addition, each local government, taking the prices of private goods as given, (i) has a balanced budget and (ii) chooses its production of public goods in such a way that no group that contains more than \(q/(q+1)\) of its residents, where q denotes the number of public goods produced, will unanimously prefer another affordable vector of public goods.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4076920
zbMATH Keywords: voting-market equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: local public goods economies
zbMATH Keywords: local government
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(88)90129-9
OpenAlex ID: W1980441235
cites work: Existence of voting-market equilibria
cites work: Quasi-equilibrium in abstract economies without ordered preferences
cites work: Existence of an equilibrium with arbitrary tax schemes for financing local public goods
cites work: Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4076920