Industry structure with sequential technology choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Industry structure with sequential technology choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0659.90018
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90099-9
author: Richard McLean
author: Michael H. Riordan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Noncooperative entry deterrence arises in a market where firms enter sequentially and irreversibly choose a technology. In the case of delegated entry deterrence, the earliest firms enter with a normal technology, and pass on entry deterrence responsibilities to subsequent entrants. In the case of partial entry deterrence, the earliest firms choose an inferior technology that allows some, but not full, entry of later firms with a normal technology. In both cases, entry is deterred in that the equilibrium number of firms is smaller than would prevail if all firms were to choose a normal technology.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
zbMATH DE Number: 4079118
zbMATH Keywords: market structure theory
zbMATH Keywords: Noncooperative entry deterrence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(89)90099-9
OpenAlex ID: W1990383906
cites work: Entry Deterrence and the Free Rider Problem
cites work: Noncooperative Entry Deterrence, Uncertainty, and the Free Rider Problem
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4079118