Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Multidimensional incentive compatibility and mechanism design
zbMATH Open document ID: 0661.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90135-4
author: R. Preston McAfee
author: John McMillan
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Incentive-compatibility conditions are characterized in general for problems in which several goods are to be allocated and agents' types are multidimensional. Two questions of monopoly pricing under uncertainty are then analyzed. First, we find the optimal nonlinear pricing scheme when the monopolist knows only the distribution of an arbitrarily parameterized family of demand curves; and second, we solve for the optimal bundling policy for a multiproduct monopolist.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 4081242
zbMATH Keywords: Incentive-compatibility conditions
zbMATH Keywords: monopoly pricing under uncertainty
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(88)90135-4
OpenAlex ID: W2028275172
cites work: Regulating a Monopolist with Unknown Costs
cites work: Q4065742
cites work: Q5566063
cites work: Monopoly Provision of Quality and Warranties: An Exploration in the Theory of Multidimensional Screening
cites work: Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information
cites work: The taxation principle and multi-time Hamilton-Jacobi equations
cites work: Multi-Product Quantity-Dependent Prices and Profitability Constraints
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4081242