An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An abstract two-period game with simultaneous signaling -- existence of separating equilibria
zbMATH Open document ID: 0661.90105
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(88)90137-8
author: George J. Mailath
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Consider the following game: There are n agents, each with private information, simultaneously choosing actions in each of two periods. Agents revise their beliefs after observing first-period actions and before choosing second-period actions. In a separating equilibrium, all private information is revealed in the first period. Existence of separating equilibria is demonstrated under (almost) the same set of assumptions which guarantee it in each of the n one-sides signaling games (where only one agent has private information payoff relevant in the second period). The simultaneity of decisions leads to a substantial technical difficulty which must be overcome.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 4081339
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: simultaneous signaling
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: first-period actions
zbMATH Keywords: second-period actions
zbMATH Keywords: separating equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: one-sides signaling games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(88)90137-8
OpenAlex ID: W1997217175
cites work: Q3705978
cites work: Q3254057
cites work: Sequential Equilibria
cites work: Simultaneous Signaling in an Oligopoly Model
cites work: Incentive Compatibility in Signaling Games with a Continuum of Types
cites work: Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis
cites work: Q3964914
cites work: Informational Equilibrium
cites work: Q5526189
cites work: Global inverse function theorems
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4081339