Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games - correction and further development
zbMATH Open document ID: 0666.90095
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90040-6
author: Reinhard Selten
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1988-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper corrects a mistake concerning sufficient conditions for evolutionary stability in an earlier paper of the author [ibid. 5, 269- 363 (1983; Zbl 0534.90095)]. A new kind of decomposition of a symmetric extensive two-person game into a `top' and an `abridgement' is introduced. It is shown that regularity of a direct ESS imply a robustness property with respect to small payoff changes called essentiality. On the basis of the result on regularity and essentiality sufficient conditions for a regular limit ESS are obtained. These conditions make use of the decomposition into `top' and `abridgement'. Finally it is proved that the sufficient conditions are satisfied for the many-period models with ritual fights and escalated conflicts introduced in the earlier paper.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 92B05
zbMATH DE Number: 4091223
zbMATH Keywords: sufficient conditions
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: decomposition of a symmetric extensive two-person game
zbMATH Keywords: top
zbMATH Keywords: abridgement
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(88)90040-6
OpenAlex ID: W2022803142
cites work: Q3921038
cites work: The Logic of Animal Conflict
cites work: Q3040961
cites work: Non-cooperative games
cites work: Q5844986
cites work: On stability of perfect equilibrium points
cites work: Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
cites work: Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
cites work: Q5516558
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091223