Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibria of the sealed-bid mechanism for bargaining with incomplete information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0669.90099
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We study the Nash equilibria of the sealed-bid bargaining mechanism with incomplete information, a nonzero-sum game. For the case of uniform priors, we describe two uncountably numerous families of equilibria: the first has differentiable strategies; in the second the strategies are step-functions. The efficiencies of these equilibria range from ``second best'' to zero. For independent nonuniform priors, we show that a similar situation obtains. These results seem discouraging with regard to using the sealed-bid mechanism in practice. The mechanism might be salvaged, however, if bargainers turn out to confine themselves to linear-strategy equilibria.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 4097153
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: sealed-bid bargaining mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: nonzero-sum game
zbMATH Keywords: differentiable strategies
author: Wolfgang Leininger
author: Peter B. Linhart
author: Roy Radner
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(89)90120-8
OpenAlex ID: W2051378472
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4097153