Optimal investment, financing, and dividends. A Stackelberg differential game
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal investment, financing, and dividends. A Stackelberg differential game
zbMATH Open document ID: 0674.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1889(89)90028-6
author: Peter M. Kort
author: Geert-Jan C. Th. van Schijndel
author: Steffen Jørgensen
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: An open loop three-player Stackelberg game, with the manager of a firm as the leader and two shareholders as followers is considered. Each shareholder maximizes the integral taxable earnings from share transactions plus dividends, and capital gains at the horizon date; the manager maximizes integral accumulated profits after corporate tax. The manager controls investments, borrowing, lending; the shareholders control the share price and dividends. Closed form results are given, with their qualitative interpretation, about an open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium. The model of the firm is a simple linear relation between the stock of capital goods, debt, and the present value of retained earnings. Only a fixed share transactions price is allowed.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B38
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A23
zbMATH DE Number: 4104658
zbMATH Keywords: firm modelling
zbMATH Keywords: microeconomics
zbMATH Keywords: leader-follower
zbMATH Keywords: open loop three-player Stackelberg game
reviewed by: L. F. Pau
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-1889(89)90028-6
OpenAlex ID: W1577620012
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published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4104658