A new informational base for social choice
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A new informational base for social choice
zbMATH Open document ID: 0678.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(89)90004-8
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1989-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem that a non-manipulable social choice function is dictatorial is based on complete orderings of alternatives by voters. This paper proves a similar result based on complete orderings of sets of alternatives by voters. In that case, non-manipulability implies the existence of a one-third minority coalition of voters that can prevent a particular alternative from being chosen.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 4112334
zbMATH Keywords: non-manipulable social choice function
zbMATH Keywords: non-manipulability
zbMATH Keywords: minority coalition
author: Jerry S. Kelly
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(89)90004-8
OpenAlex ID: W2020848516
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4112334