Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Hierarchies of conditional beliefs and interactive epistemology in dynamic games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0972.91020
author: Pierpaolo Battigalli
author: Marciano Siniscalchi
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1999-12-06T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1814/674
review text: This paper suggests a model for understanding some of the puzzles and paradoxes of extensive analysis. The authors claims are supported by a collection of results related to the notion of common certainty of rationality in two-player multistage games with observed actions. It is an interesting paper.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 1375348
zbMATH Keywords: extensive analysis
zbMATH Keywords: rationality
zbMATH Keywords: multistage games
reviewed by: Prabhat Kumar Mahanti
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2167649812
cites work: Backward induction and common knowledge of rationality
cites work: A necessary and sufficient epistemic condition for playing backward induction
cites work: Q4955434
cites work: Rationality, Nash Equilibrium and Backwards Induction in Perfect- Information Games
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
cites work: Hierarchies of beliefs and common knowledge
cites work: Real Analysis and Probability
cites work: Game theory
cites work: Q3107917
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
cites work: Coherent beliefs are not always types.
cites work: Topology-free typology of beliefs
cites work: Q4323294
cites work: Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
cites work: Multistage Games with Communication
cites work: Q3576736
cites work: Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
cites work: Backward Induction, Normal Form Perfection and Explicable Equilibria
cites work: Common belief and the theory of games with perfect information
cites work: On a new axiomatic theory of probability
cites work: Hypothetical knowledge and games with perfect information
cites work: Belief revision in games: Forward and backward induction
cites work: The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games
DOI: 10.1006/JETH.1999.2555
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1375348