Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategically zero-sum games: The class of games whose completely mixed equilibria cannot be improved upon
zbMATH Open document ID: 0419.90087
DOI: 10.1007/BF01769190
author: H. Moulin
author: Jean-Philippe Vial
published in: International Journal of Game Theory
publication date: 1978-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3653903
zbMATH Keywords: strategically zero-sum games
zbMATH Keywords: strategically equivalent games
zbMATH Keywords: classification of 2 x 2 bimatrix games
zbMATH Keywords: two-person noncooperative games
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769190
OpenAlex ID: W1988716172
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3653903