Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0431.90009
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90036-X
author: James M. Enelow
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1979-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3671970
zbMATH Keywords: strategic manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: individual decision rules
zbMATH Keywords: multi-valued collective choice rules
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
cites work: Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules
cites work: Manipulation of social choice functions
cites work: Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(79)90036-x
OpenAlex ID: W2055169496
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3671970