Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collective rationality and dictatorship: The scope of the Arrow theorem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0432.90007
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90012-7
author: Douglas H. Blair
author: Robert A. Pollak
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1979-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3673813
zbMATH Keywords: collective rationality
zbMATH Keywords: dictatorship
zbMATH Keywords: social choice
zbMATH Keywords: relaxation of conditions
zbMATH Keywords: generalization
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(79)90012-7
OpenAlex ID: W2046680136
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3673813