Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Randomized preference aggregation: Additivity of power and strategy proofness
zbMATH Open document ID: 0437.90008
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(80)90060-5
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1980-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3683303
zbMATH Keywords: randomized preference aggregation
zbMATH Keywords: additivity of power
zbMATH Keywords: strategy proofness
zbMATH Keywords: mixed social welfare functions
zbMATH Keywords: strict social welfare scheme
zbMATH Keywords: allocation of power
zbMATH Keywords: probability measure
zbMATH Keywords: decision schemes
zbMATH Keywords: voting
zbMATH Keywords: decision superscheme
zbMATH Keywords: Arrow's impossibility theorem
zbMATH Keywords: binary social welfare scheme
zbMATH Keywords: Paretian social welfare scheme
author: Andrew McLennan
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(80)90060-5
OpenAlex ID: W2073983401
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
cites work: Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3683303