Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Double deception: Two against one in three-person games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0454.90094
DOI: 10.1007/BF02342605
author: Steven J. Brams
author: Frank C. Zagare
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 1981-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3711793
zbMATH Keywords: deception
zbMATH Keywords: three-person voting games
zbMATH Keywords: misrepresentation of preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3711793