An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An incentive model of duopoly with government coordination
zbMATH Open document ID: 0471.90023
DOI: 10.1016/0005-1098(81)90069-8
author: S. H. Smith
published in: Automatica
publication date: 1981-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 3739250
zbMATH Keywords: government coordination
zbMATH Keywords: duopoly
zbMATH Keywords: decision-dependent information structure
zbMATH Keywords: optimal coordination
zbMATH Keywords: static market model
zbMATH Keywords: Stackelberg game
zbMATH Keywords: one leader
zbMATH Keywords: two Nash followers
zbMATH Keywords: incentive mechanism
zbMATH Keywords: voluntary cooperation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0005-1098(81)90069-8
OpenAlex ID: W2043247697
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3739250